




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West European Terrorism: The Indigenous Threat to NATO and US Interests

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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NI IIM 85-10005
April 1985

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**WEST EUROPEAN TERRORISM:
THE INDIGENOUS THREAT TO
NATO AND US INTERESTS**

Information available as of 17 April 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
SCOPE NOTE	1
KEY JUDGMENTS	3
DISCUSSION	7
Introduction.....	7
The Red Army Faction	7
The Three-Phased Offensive.....	7
Target: NATO.....	9
The Internationalization of West European Terrorism.. ..	9
The Role of the RAF	10
Evidence of Linkages Among European Terrorist Groups	10
The Question of FP-25 Involvement.....	10
The Basques	12
Prospects for Expansion of Terrorist Linkages in Western Europe.....	13
Extent of Connections to Middle Eastern Groups.....	14
The Question of Soviet Involvement.....	14
Prospects for Counterterrorist Successes	15
Implications for US Interests.....	16

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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum examines the threat posed to the United States and NATO in Western Europe by indigenous terrorist groups. It focuses on the groups involved in the current terrorist campaign against NATO, assesses the degree of cooperation among them, and considers the prospects for the expansion of violence to NATO countries not yet affected. In particular, it examines:

- The recent activities of the Red Army Faction, Direct Action, and the Communist Combatant Cells.
- The reasons for the absence of the Red Brigades in the current campaign.
- The impact on US and NATO interests.
- The prospects for counterterrorist successes in the affected West European countries.

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This paper does not address the activities of Middle Eastern or other non-European terrorist groups in Western Europe

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Recent terrorist attacks in Western Europe have again focused attention on possible linkages among the West European terrorist groups, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] These links have manifested themselves in a joint communique by Direct Action (AD) and the Red Army Faction (RAF) calling for a united "anti-imperialist front," shared targets, common ideologies, and, in some cases, logistic assistance. [REDACTED]

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Insofar as there is linkage, we believe that West Germany's Red Army Faction is the principal player:

- The initial phase of the campaign, which began in the summer of 1984, conforms to the plans laid out in RAF documents [REDACTED]

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- The focus of the terrorist offensive has been in West Germany, and much of what has occurred in this campaign follows the modus operandi of RAF operations in the past.
- The RAF has extensive support networks within West Germany and in the surrounding West European countries that could ensure the communications necessary for cooperation between groups.

Other West European groups may join the campaign of violence, although much of this could occur as acts to demonstrate solidarity rather than direct cooperation with the main players:

- The Portuguese group, FP-25, has undertaken several anti-NATO attacks during this campaign, but we see no indication that this group is directly cooperating with the terrorist organizations involved in the offensive.
- Italy's Red Brigades (BR) has been noticeably absent from the campaign. However, given the BR's actions against US and NATO targets in the past and its calls for a united front in Western Europe, as well as its probable ties to other extremist groups, especially in Paris, the Red Brigades may well become involved in anti-NATO attacks in Italy during the coming year.

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Although we cannot predict when the terrorists will resume their attacks on NATO targets, we expect that the RAF, at least, will seek a high-level US or NATO target when this occurs. Successful counterterrorist operations will have a major impact on the abilities of the various groups to continue to carry out major terrorist operations, such as assassinations, large-scale bombings, and kidnappings. In the past, the West Germans have successfully neutralized the RAF for substantial periods of time, and we anticipate that they will be successful again in disrupting the organization. The French

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can be expected to curb Direct Action. The Belgians lack experience and technical capabilities for dealing with terrorism, and are not likely to be as effective in coping with the current situation during the time frame of this Memorandum.

Despite the need for interaction among the affected West European nations, we expect that most will continue to prefer to deal bilaterally with terrorism, rather than in multilateral settings. The French, in particular, have been forced to take a stronger stance against terrorism than they have in the past, but the contentious issue of extradition—especially of Italian extremists in Paris—has not been resolved. Most countries have voiced support for intensified counterterrorist cooperation, and the French, West Germans, and Belgians are cooperating to find ways to counter the terrorist threat. However, we do not expect any West European country will make significant—and permanent—policy changes regarding terrorism as a consequence of this spate of violence.

We have no evidence that the Soviets supply, guide, or control West European terrorist groups in this campaign. However, the USSR and East European countries have permitted European terrorists to transit those countries en route to the Middle East. Moreover, because European terrorist activity parallels the Soviet goal of destabilizing Western Europe, we do not expect Moscow and its East European allies to support international efforts to combat terrorism in Western Europe.

By itself, the terrorist assault on NATO will probably not cause any West European country to alter its views on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces or arms control. There is no base of support among West European publics for terrorism; on the contrary, violence involving human casualties has had a sharply negative impact on public opinion. The leaders of the West European peace movement, for example, have been careful to distance themselves from what they view

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as senseless violence. We believe that the main impact of the heightened terrorist threat to US and NATO interests is the continued requirement for greatly increased security measures at installations and for rigorous and sustained security around US officials considered to be potential targets.

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DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. The recent terrorist campaign spearheaded by the Red Army Faction (RAF) against NATO, US, and other Western targets conforms to the plans laid out in RAF documents [redacted]

[redacted] The campaign has expanded, however, and at least two other groups—Direct Action (AD) in France and the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) in Belgium—have joined the RAF in a loosely organized terrorist offensive in Western Europe. [redacted]

[redacted] there are some indications of links between the groups. Portugal's Popular Forces of April 25 (FP-25) has also engaged in a series of anti-NATO attacks, although there are no indications of direct ties to the RAF, AD, or CCC. Italy's Red Brigades (BR) has been noticeably absent from the campaign, but it may well join when attacks against NATO targets are resumed, or may undertake similar attacks in Italy.

2. The timing of this resurgence of violence has been the subject of much speculation. The current terrorist actions are an opportunistic attempt to capitalize on the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment. Indeed, in the fall of 1983, terrorist actions in opposition to deployment were anticipated by various governments in Western Europe, but a concerted terrorist campaign never materialized, probably because the groups involved lacked the necessary organizational structure at that time. There is little doubt that INF deployment has helped fuel the terrorist resurgence, but for most terrorists INF is only symptomatic of the larger "target," which is NATO itself and the role of the United States in Western Europe and elsewhere.

3. The emphasis on NATO as a target is not a dramatic change in strategy for West European terrorist groups. The RAF, for example, has always been motivated by an "anti-imperialist" ideology, which by the late 1970s had become a basis for attacks on NATO targets. Direct Action has consistently espoused an "anticapitalist" ideology since its beginnings in the late 1970s. The Red Brigades, though not yet active in the recent violence against NATO, has long used the

anti-NATO theme. Focusing on NATO as the symbol of imperialism can be viewed as a logical step in the evolution of West European terrorist ideology. The only new element in the campaign is the overt expression of linkage among groups, although communiques from both the RAF and the Red Brigades in the late 1970s and 1980s called for the creation of a united anti-imperialist front.

4. If the terrorists wanted to capitalize on the INF issue at the original deployment dates, it appears in retrospect that they did not have the organizational structures to carry out major incidents. During the period of late 1982 through early 1984, AD and the RAF both experienced losses. They worked to rebuild their membership, and chose not to launch attacks until these efforts were completed. The CCC did not exist until late 1984.

5. There is insufficient evidence to determine what specific event set the activity in motion. There is no benchmark (such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon) on which to peg the beginning of the campaign.

6. We believe the hiatus in terrorist attacks directed against NATO targets since February 1985 will be temporary—unless the various European security services are successful in arresting the leading terrorists. Terrorist activity is likely to be cyclical, with periods of inactivity during planning and preparation phases for major attacks, such as assassinations or car bombings. [redacted]

[redacted] the RAF might attempt the kidnaping of a high-level official outside the Federal Republic to increase the pressure on the West German Government and possibly on NATO. Such pressure could be used as leverage to demand the release of imprisoned terrorists, or simply to embarrass the West German Government or NATO.

The Red Army Faction

The Three-Phased Offensive

7. Despite the assumption by some European officials that the RAF's infrastructure had been essentially destroyed following a series of West German Government counterterrorist successes in 1982 and 1983, the

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RAF: Historical Background

The Red Army Faction had its origins in the violent student protests in West Germany in the late 1960s. In 1970 Andreas Baader, who was serving time in a West Berlin prison for attempted arson of a department store, was forcibly freed by a group of West German radicals, including the well-known leftist journalist, Ulrike Meinhof. The group apparently went to the Middle East shortly thereafter for guerrilla training. Returning to West Germany, they adopted the name Red Army Faction because they considered their organization a component of the world revolutionary struggle. According to their many manifestos, the group's goals were—and are—to destroy the West German state by intensifying societal conflicts, which will reveal the system's "latent fascism," and to destroy US and NATO "imperialism." These goals have stayed basically intact over the years, but the group has focused on different targets from time to time. In the early 1970s, the US military was a major target, but by the mid-1970s—the peak of RAF activity—the group was focusing on symbolic figures of the West German establishment. By the end of the decade the focus had shifted to NATO targets.

The RAF has traditionally been organized into tiers: the hardcore members (commandos) who live underground and carry out the terrorist attacks, and a support network—sometimes referred to as the "legal" RAF, the militants, or the periphery—which provides propaganda support and helps the imprisoned terrorists maintain contact with the outside world. In some cases members of this network have actually provided logistic support for certain operations, crossing the line of legality. This network has also historically served as the reservoir for the recruitment of new members to the hardcore. During its peak in the mid-1970s, there were probably 20 to 25 hardcore members and possibly 200 supporters. Currently, there are perhaps 10 to 15 hardcore members and perhaps 200 supporters, although it is difficult to estimate the size of the latter group.

The RAF terrorists are well versed in urban guerrilla warfare. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s they excelled in marksmanship, the manufacture of forged documents, the use of disguises, the ability to remain hidden in urban areas, and the meticulous planning of operations. Moreover, imprisoned RAF members conducted extensive communications with their comrades on the outside through an elaborate system involving their defense lawyers and their families. The speed with which the recent hunger strike spread among the variously located terrorists indicates that this communications system still exists.

The most significant anti-German RAF terrorist attacks occurred in 1977 when West German Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback, financier Juergen Ponto, and industrialist Hans-Martin Schleyer and his bodyguards were killed. Schleyer had been kidnaped and held for several weeks while the terrorists negotiated with the West German Government in an effort to obtain the release of RAF members in prison. The hijacking of a Lufthansa plane by Arab terrorists was timed to increase the pressure on the government. The rescue of the plane and hostages at Mogadishu ended the terrorists' hopes that they could free their comrades, and Schleyer was killed. Several RAF members in prison then committed suicide, including Andreas Baader.

Significant RAF attacks against US targets include the 1979 attempt to assassinate then NATO commander Gen. Alexander Haig in Belgium, the bombing in August 1981 of NATO Air Force Headquarters at Ramstein, West Germany, and the rocket attack in September 1981 on then USAREUR commander Gen. Frederick Kroesen in Heidelberg.

In late 1982, West German security officials launched a successful counterterrorist operation against the RAF, and three of the key leaders—Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Christian Klar, and Adelheid Schulz—were arrested. Numerous caches of weapons, supplies, and money were also discovered. This was a major setback for the organization, and it was essentially inactive until 1984.

Accumulating evidence indicates that, during this period of RAF inactivity, the group was steadily rebuilding its organization and recruiting new members to the hardcore. It is increasingly evident that the RAF periphery—many of whom have had a long involvement over the years with the organization—has been heavily involved in the buildup. The new faces on the most-wanted posters are all members of the support network who have apparently joined the hardcore.

Until the hunger strike and the low-level bombings in late 1984, the group's operations were limited to actions designed to strengthen its logistic base: a bank robbery and a weapons theft. The arrests of seven terrorists in June and July and the discovery of numerous RAF documents provided evidence to security officials that the group had indeed rebuilt its organization and—most important—was planning to engage in a terrorist offensive.

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[redacted] current situation in West Germany prove that the group had not only reorganized, but had also planned extensively for its next offensive. This offensive has as a goal not only an assault on symbolic NATO targets, but also a demonstration that the RAF is a revitalized organization.

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increased. The most ominous implication of this, of course, is that, as security is increased around one potential target, the RAF and its allies will probably move to another, less predictable, one.

Target: NATO

11. The anti-NATO/anti-imperialist focus of this new offensive is in keeping with the general theme of RAF goals over the past 15 years. [redacted]

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hunger strike began on 4 December 1984 with an announcement by two leading terrorists on trial in Stuttgart, and it was joined by some 33 terrorists in jail throughout West Germany, as well as by imprisoned AD members in France. This strike was supported extensively by RAF sympathizers in West Germany, who engaged in numerous low-intensity attacks directed against US, NATO, and other Western interests during late 1984 and early 1985. The hunger strike ended following the assassination of the West German industrialist Ernst Zimmermann in February; a communique issued after his death called on the imprisoned RAF members to give up the strike because the goal of mobilization had been realized.

9. [redacted] a series of "spectacular actions" with the objective of gaining maximum media exposure and human casualties. [redacted]

[redacted] A spectacular action was [redacted] any major terrorist attack: a car bombing of a military base; an assassination of a high-ranking US or NATO official or of a symbolic figure of the West German judiciary, police, politics, or industry; or a kidnapping of one of these officials.

10. [redacted] On the basis of what has occurred so far—the attempted car bombing at Oberammergau, which would have been spectacular had the device not failed to detonate; the Zimmermann assassination in Munich; and possibly the Audran assassination in Paris—we believe that the targets for these major attacks are carefully selected and are subject to change if security measures are

12. The NATO pipeline [redacted]

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The number of attacks on it during this current campaign—by both the RAF in West Germany and the CCC in Belgium—is an indication of its accessibility and vulnerability.

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13. Of the attacks carried out so far by the RAF and the CCC, [redacted]

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[redacted] the assassination of Dr. Zimmermann, the chairman of one of West Germany's defense industries in Munich; the attempted car bombing at the NATO Training School in Oberammergau; the bombing of the French Embassy Annex in Bonn; and the various NATO pipeline bombings in West Germany and Belgium.

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The Internationalization of West European Terrorism

14. Calls by West European terrorist groups for a united front to combat imperialism are not new, although in the past such calls have not been successful in bringing the groups together. Until this recent

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campaign, most of the statements urging the creation of a common front were nothing more than solidarity statements—which cost nothing and helped promote the appropriate revolutionary credentials among terrorist groups. Perhaps the most famous statement of this kind was the BR's first communique during the Dozier kidnaping, when the group called on the RAF, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to join with them in fighting imperialism. In fact, the author of the communique [] had issued the statement more in the hopes of getting in contact with the other groups than from any real plan to internationalize the Dozier kidnaping.

The Role of the RAF

15. The RAF has historically had circles of supporters in various European countries—especially the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Switzerland—who have provided logistic support and safehouses upon occasion. Some of these supporters were members of actual organizations, such as the Red Help, which during the 1970s maintained chapters in various West European countries. These organizations originally provided aid to imprisoned leftist terrorists, but they soon evolved into support networks for terrorists—mainly the RAF—on the outside. There were also in several West European countries RAF prisoner support committees that tended to go beyond the maintenance of ties to imprisoned terrorists. In at least one case, the 1979 assassination attempt on General Haig in Belgium, members of the Belgian Support Committee for RAF Prisoners were suspected of having been involved with the RAF in the operation. Although the connection was never proved, we believe this organization was involved with the RAF in this attack. During the 1970s and early 1980s, RAF safehouses were uncovered in most of the surrounding West European countries. The RAF's ability to regenerate an organization in the wake of successful counter-terrorist operations is probably facilitated by its many contacts abroad.

Evidence of Linkages Among European Terrorist Groups

16. There is no evidence that the West European terrorist groups are engaged in a fully coordinated campaign, but some cooperation among them is evident:

- Explosives stolen from a quarry site in Belgium last summer have been used in car bombing attempts both by AD at the Western European

Union in Paris in August 1984 and by the RAF at the NATO Training School in Oberammergau last December. It has been speculated that the CCC has also used some of these explosives, but this cannot be confirmed.

- The NATO pipeline [] The CCC carried out a number of attacks on the pipeline in Belgium late last year, including one that had been marked in the RAF documents.

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- Responsibility for the attack last fall on the radio relay station at Bierset Air Base in Belgium was claimed by the CCC to be a gesture of solidarity with the 1981 RAF attack on Ramstein Air Base in West Germany.

- The CCC claimed responsibility for the 15 January attack on the NATO Support Facility in Brussels, and characterized it as an act of solidarity with the RAF hunger strikers. This bombing marked a significant escalation of CCC operations.

- The RAF and AD issued a joint communique on 15 January 1985 declaring their unity in the offensive on NATO. []

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- The assassination on 25 January of General Audran in Paris, for which AD claimed responsibility, is believed to have been a joint operation of AD and the RAF. []

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17. While the evidence is not overwhelming, there are sufficient indicators to posit at least minimal logistic ties between these three terrorist groups, and the Audran case argues for cooperative arrangements for some attacks. []

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[] the current status of the three groups point to the RAF as the most important player in the campaign.

The Question of FP-25 Involvement

18. Evidence that the attacks on US and NATO targets in Portugal by FP-25 are a part of this

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Direct Action

Direct Action is a radical, leftist, anarchist organization that first appeared in France in the late 1970s, although many of the members had been involved in various other anarchist groups earlier in the decade. AD has always supported itself through bank robberies and,

[redacted] has sound financial reserves. It also has access to a variety of weapons, most of which were stolen at various times. Until the assassination on 25 January 1985 of Gen. Rene Audran, the French Ministry of Defense official responsible for international arms sales—which was claimed by AD—the group's operations were mostly confined to low-level bombings directed against a variety of "imperialist" targets in France. (AD has engaged in police shootouts on a couple of occasions and, in one instance, two policemen were killed. However, the group stated afterward that they only fired in self-defense.) Nevertheless, AD's operations have never put it in the category of the more violent West European terrorist groups, such as the RAF and the Red Brigades.

French security officials have operated successfully against AD over the years. [redacted]

In 1980, following a series of arrests, most of the AD members were in jail, but in 1981 the new Mitterrand government amnestied or pardoned most of them. By 1982 it was evident that this amnesty had served only to revitalize AD: the group was publishing its anticapitalist doctrine in the French radical press and had already undertaken a number of bombings. Additionally, AD was rebuilding its organization and recruiting new members from extremist circles in Paris. As a result of the increased activities of the newly reorganized AD, the French Government declared the group illegal in 1982.

In 1982-83, a new organization in France, the Fighting Communist Organization (OCC), was beginning to develop. Its goal was to coordinate the armed revolutionary struggle against imperialism in Western Europe. The name OCC was apparently inspired by Red Brigades literature. [redacted] it has never carried out any attacks as far as we know—but it was an attempt to unite various leftist organizations, including Direct Action, remnants of other French anarchist organizations, and Italian and German extremists residing in France. The groups within the OCC would

keep their autonomy, but would establish relations on a political and ideological basis. Several extremists who are believed to be involved with the current terrorist campaign in Western Europe—including several AD members and the suspected leader of Belgium's CCC—were also involved with this organization.

AD's foreign contacts are numerous. [redacted]

[redacted] There is a known relationship between two AD leaders and the suspected leader of the CCC, all of whom are currently on the run, and other AD members have turned up in Belgium from time to time. Connections to other European extremists in Paris are apparently extensive, although the purpose of these contacts is unclear. In December 1984, the French arrested a number of AD members in the Paris area, among them several Italian fugitive terrorists and a German who during the 1970s was regarded as a member of the RAF. The police also confiscated numerous documents, including Red Brigades literature that had been translated into French. Direct Action is also alleged to have ties to Middle Eastern extremists, particularly to the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), a terrorist organization that has operated against US and Israeli targets in France. Although there is circumstantial evidence to support the theory that AD provided logistic support to LARF in one of its operations, the ties between the two groups are far from proven. Moreover, we do not believe that LARF is a player in the current indigenous terrorist campaign in Western Europe, although it could carry out an operation against a US target there at any time.

AD claimed credit, in the name of an RAF commando, for the assassination on 25 January of Gen. Rene Audran, the French Ministry of Defense official responsible for international arms sales. This was the first such assassination by AD. [redacted]

[redacted] In fact, most West European security services now accept that the RAF was involved in this assassination, although it cannot be proved.

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Communist Combatant Cells

The CCC first appeared in October 1984 with the bombings in Brussels of the Litton and Honeywell firms and the German firm M.A.N. In three separate communiques claiming credit, the CCC gave as reason for the attacks the firms' functions as NATO defense suppliers. Subsequently, there were two attacks on Belgian political party offices, alleged to be part of the support structure for NATO imperialism in Belgium, and then a series of attacks on the NATO pipeline in Belgium. None of these attacks was designed to cause human casualties. In January 1985, however, the CCC escalated the intensity of their attacks with the car bombing of the NATO Support Facility in Brussels. No one was killed, but two security guards would have been had they not left the building when they saw two people running from a car. In a communique, the CCC stated that they would no longer attempt to avoid human casualties in their attacks.

Information on the CCC is fragmentary and speculative. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Belgium has been used as a transit point by various terrorist groups, which have probably been aided by these indigenous support groups.

Some of those under investigation for membership in the CCC—the whereabouts of whom are unknown—include extremists who were members of the Belgian Support Committee for RAF Prisoners—the group previously mentioned in connection with the RAF assassination attempt on General Haig in 1979. During the recent campaign, there were indications that some of those who were involved in this committee in the 1970s and who were investigated for the Haig attempt have had contacts with West German RAF supporters.

There are also indications of ties between the CCC and AD. The alleged leader of the CCC has been seen with two of AD's leaders in the past; all three are on the run. Various AD members have turned up in Belgium from time to time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There was much speculation after the initial bombings last fall that the CCC might actually be a covername for AD. It is now generally accepted among West European security services that the CCC is a Belgian organization, although it is possible that some non-Belgians are members of the group or have some influence on it.

cooperative campaign is less compelling. The group, however, appears to be attempting to align itself with the goals of the anti-NATO offensive, perhaps to win

“respect” from other more experienced terrorist groups or possibly to maximize publicity. Although most of FP-25's efforts have lacked the professionalism of those claimed by the RAF, AD, or CCC, the group's recent assassination of a Portuguese industrialist was a rather sophisticated attack.

19. FP-25's origins are quite different from those of the other West European terrorist groups. The organization claims to represent the “exploited Portuguese workers” who fought for the revolution that began on 25 April 1974. Its alleged leader was the military strategist of the 1974 revolution. Unlike the typical anarchists in other West European terrorist groups, many of FP-25's original members aspired to setting up an actual revolutionary government.

20. During the past few months, FP-25 members seem to have been motivated by the anti-imperialist/anti-NATO sentiments generally espoused by West European terrorist organizations. There have been reports from time to time of contacts [REDACTED] between FP-25 and other European terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades and ETA. Additionally, there have been reports that FP-25 members have in the past received training in Libya and other Middle Eastern countries.

21. Regardless of whether FP-25 is part of the cooperative campaign, we believe that the group poses a threat to US and NATO interests in Portugal. Lisbon undertook a massive counterterrorist effort last summer, which resulted in the arrests of most of the leaders and many members. Yet the terrorism continues. The operational core of the group that remains has broadened its focus to include the anti-imperialist theme.

The Basques

22. The other attack on NATO interests last fall was the bombing of the NATO pipeline in Spain, which was claimed by the Basque terrorist group, ETA. The group stated, however, that it had attacked the Spanish military, and it is unclear whether ETA realized it was a NATO facility. ETA's goals are more parochial than those of the West European terrorist groups involved in the current campaign, and, although there have been contacts between ETA and AD and between ETA and some Belgian extremists, there is no information suggesting that the Basques are involved in the current campaign. Acts against NATO or US targets, designed to show Basque solidarity with other terrorist groups, could occur, but Spanish interests—and French interests in Spain—are likely to remain the focus of ETA's terrorist operations.

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Prospects for Expansion of Terrorist Linkages in Western Europe

23. Although we have not had any specific information indicating the Red Brigades or any other Italian terrorist group plans to join the current spate of terrorist operations, this may occur. The Italian Red Brigades has been noticeably absent from the anti-NATO campaign, a surprising development because BR members have for several years called for an anti-imperialist front in Western Europe. In a February 1984 communique, following the assassination of American diplomat Leamon Hunt in Rome, the BR reiterated its call for the internationalization of West European terrorism. The BR has been severely weakened in recent years by successful police operations—

[redacted] the BR has been divided over ideological questions in recent months, and this dissension probably has contributed to its lack of activity in the recent campaign. The BR's recent assassination of an Italian economics professor may indicate the group's intention to return to its more traditional domestic targets, rather than joining the anti-NATO campaign.

24.

[redacted] During the arrests in December 1984 of several AD members, a number of Italians were found with them and also arrested. Another possible reason why the BR has kept such a low profile in the current terrorist campaign is that members wish to avoid antagonizing French officials, who are under pressure from the Italian Government to extradite fugitive terrorists.

25.

[redacted] the Netherlands historically has had a radical leftist fringe that sympathizes with the goals of the RAF. [redacted] currently a network of former RAF supporters in contact with antimilitarist elements in the Netherlands and RAF elements in West Germany. Some of these people were members of the Red Resistance Front (RRF)—an organization created during the 1970s in the Netherlands to provide support to RAF prisoners, but which eventually provided safehouses for terrorists on the run and logistic support for operations.

26. The recent attacks in Groningen by a group calling itself the Northern Terror Front were claimed to show solidarity with the anti-NATO campaign. We do not know anything about this group, or whether it is an actual organization. [redacted]

[redacted] The unprofessional nature of the attacks by the Northern Terror Front suggests that they are "copycat" actions.

27. There are no indications that Irish terrorists are involved in the current violence. Although both the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) and the PIRA have had contacts with other European groups, and have operated against British interests on the Continent, their goals are much narrower than the all-encompassing anti-NATO philosophy of the current campaign. It is unlikely that either group would devote the resources needed to play a major role in this campaign. However, attacks on British officials or installations connected with NATO—either in Great Britain or on the Continent—as demonstrations of solidarity with other European terrorist groups are not unlikely.

28. The RAF has attempted in some cases to identify with Irish terrorists. The hunger strike itself evoked memories of the 1981 IRA strike, although the West German terrorists apparently were not prepared to die, as was the case in Northern Ireland. Leaflets referring to the Irish hunger strike appeared in the Frankfurt area during the RAF protest. Additionally, the RAF claimed the Zimmermann assassination in the name of one of the "martyred" Irish terrorists who died on the 1981 hunger strike.

29. The anti-NATO campaign could expand into Greece, where the anti-US/anti-NATO sentiment is strong. The attempted bombing in late February of the West German Embassy in Athens was claimed by its perpetrators as a gesture of solidarity with the anti-imperialist front. The earlier bombing of a bar in Athens frequented by US soldiers, though not necessarily related, is another indication of the potential that exists. In the past there have been ties—which may still exist—between some RAF members and Greek anarchists, although the exact nature of the relationship has never been clear.

30. In Spain, the recent bombing of a restaurant near a US military base may have been carried out by the antifascist group, GRAPO, a small, violently anti-US terrorist organization. Strong police crackdowns, including one in early 1985, have failed to destroy the

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organization. Reports that GRAPO members may be in contact with members of AD indicate the potential for the anti-NATO campaign to spread to Spain.

Extent of Connections to Middle Eastern Groups

31. Much of the concern about Middle Eastern terrorism in Western Europe focuses on the threat from state-sponsored groups—the Iranians, Syrians, and Libyans. While this threat is serious, there are no indications that it is connected to the threat from indigenous terrorist groups. The origins and goals of state-sponsored terrorism are quite different from those of the European terrorist groups involved in the current campaign.

32. Links between European and Middle Eastern groups is another question, however; there have been ties between some groups in the past. During the early and mid-1970s, various members of the RAF (most of whom are now dead, in jail, or still in the Middle East) were trained in Palestinian camps, probably run by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in various Middle Eastern countries.

33. In addition to training, there have been other instances of RAF connections to Middle Eastern terrorists, although the extent of the involvement is not known. During the Schleyer kidnaping in 1977, the hijacking of a Lufthansa airplane by the Haddad wing of the PFLP was timed to increase the pressure on the West German Government to release imprisoned RAF members. It was never clear, however, that the RAF knew about the hijacking in advance. In the attack on General Kroesen in 1981, the RAF employed a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), which they had undoubtedly learned to use in the Middle East. The question of where they got the weapon has never been answered—there have been reports that it came from the PFLP and other reports that it came from Libya.

34. Most of the speculation concerning Direct Action ties to the Middle East focuses on the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF). There is some evidence that AD has provided logistic support to LARF in at least one operation, but we do not know the extent of the relationship.

35. Other European groups have had some ties to the Middle East, although most of the reporting on this is historical. Irish, Spanish, and Dutch terrorists have all trained at various times in Palestinian camps. There have also been reports of Red Brigades members in

Palestinian camps, but these were never confirmed. Irish terrorists have probably received arms from Libya

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36. The question of whether European terrorist organizations currently have ties to Middle Eastern groups should not obscure the fact that these groups have the capabilities to operate without such assistance. Most West European terrorist organizations have substantial financial resources, obtained largely through bank robberies, and access to a variety of weapons and explosives, usually acquired through thefts and armed robberies of gunshops or military depots. Additionally, extensive training is not required to carry out the types of terrorist operations characteristic of West European groups.

The Question of Soviet Involvement

37. [redacted] have speculated that the Soviets must be behind this current campaign because its anti-NATO theme fits in with Soviet destabilization objectives. They point out that the attitudes and activities of West European terrorists toward revolutionary violence converge with Soviet interests in that they undermine US, NATO, and other Western interests. Indeed, we see the Soviets benefiting from the disruptive effects of terrorism. However, we have no evidence that the Soviets supply, guide, or control West European terrorist groups in this campaign. Most West European terrorist groups obtain weapons and explosives through thefts and armed robberies and finance themselves through bank robberies and, occasionally, kidnapings for ransom.

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38. The USSR and East European countries have, however, permitted various West European terrorists to transit those countries en route to the Middle East while authorities looked the other way. Most East European countries, moreover, have been generally uncooperative about the extradition of terrorists under international arrest warrants. During the 1970s, for instance, Yugoslavia allowed several RAF "most wanted" terrorists, who had been detained, to leave the country when negotiations with the West German Government collapsed. We expect the Soviets and East Europeans to continue such support when it suits them. Moreover, so long as the West European groups continue their anti-imperialist campaign and attack non-Bloc targets, we do not expect Moscow or its allies to support international efforts to combat this terrorist activity.

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39. Some of the terrorist groups involved in the campaign—particularly the CCC and possibly the RAF as well—are probably attempting to exploit the opposition to INF that exists in Western Europe. Leaders of the peace movement, however, have taken pains to distance themselves from terrorism. In the Netherlands, where the government has postponed until November a final decision on deployment, and in Belgium, where deployment has just begun, the terrorist problem could conceivably complicate the debates over the INF issue, but neither government will want to appear to be giving in to terrorism. Barring a qualitative change in the types of attacks the terrorists are willing to undertake—for example, an attempt to destroy a Pershing or cruise missile or to acquire a nuclear device—we would not expect a significantly adverse impact on US policies, such as arms control or INF deployment, because of the terrorist assault on NATO.

Prospects for Counterterrorist Successes

40. Our ability to predict when or where terrorist attacks will occur is limited because we rarely have precise information about the decisions of a particular group.

The difficulties of prediction are compounded in this situation by our lack of knowledge about the degree of cooperation or collusion among the various West European terrorist groups. In the short term, however, we expect the violence to continue.

41. How long the terrorist threat to NATO lasts is directly related to the abilities of the various West European police services to apprehend some of the key terrorists. This has certainly been the case in the past, although the loss of morale within a terrorist group—because of unsuccessful attacks or just the difficulties of living on the run—could also contribute to a gradual decline of the offensive. The 1977 RAF offensive, for example, finally ended after several notorious terrorists committed suicide in prison, even though the leaders of that offensive had not been apprehended.

42. Counterterrorist capabilities differ among the various security services. The West Germans periodically have been successful in curbing the RAF, although in some cases it was due to the mistakes of the terrorists themselves rather than the capabilities of the security forces. However, given West German offi-

cial knowledge of the group and experience in dealing with them, their prospects for eventual success are good. The degree of cooperation or collusion with other terrorist groups is, however, a complicating factor. If the RAF continues to operate outside West Germany, it will be more difficult to work effectively against it because of the requirement for a broader scope of investigation and for cross-border coordination among security services.

43.

the Audran assassination seems to have driven home the point that France is not immune to terrorist attacks directed against domestic targets, and their recent talks with the West Germans about joint efforts to deal with the current wave of terrorism are encouraging. The question of the extradition of wanted terrorists—for the most part Italians—remains a contentious issue between the French Government and its West European neighbors. In the absence of a more forthcoming posture on extradition, Paris will continue to face criticism from other West European governments.

44. Prospects for Belgian counterterrorist successes are limited. Brussels has not had this kind of a domestic terrorist problem before.

45. The Italians have already expressed interest in cooperating with other West Europeans, despite the absence of the Red Brigades from the campaign. Rome has complained for years about Paris's attitude regarding terrorism, and is likely to continue to press the French to extradite Italian extremists wanted on charges in Italy.

should Italian groups enter into the offensive, the prospects for successful counterterrorist operations against them are reasonably good.

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46. In addition to the intensification of counterterrorist measures in the affected countries, the upsurge in anti-NATO terrorism has impelled West European governments to increase bilateral and, in some cases, multilateral consultations on the issue. France, in particular, has been forced to take a more active counterterrorist role. In meetings in Bonn in February, French Prime Minister Fabius and German Chancellor Kohl declared a "united front against terrorism," and both countries have characterized cooperation as very good. They have agreed to form a joint operational working group, to set up a "hot line" for intelligence exchanges on terrorism, and to tighten border controls. Both countries would like to include Belgium in joint efforts. While the Belgians have not been particularly active on the political level on the issue of terrorism, they have recently allocated a large portion of their security budget to the counterterrorist threat and are now cooperating with the French and West Germans in a joint effort to determine how they might combat the terrorist threat.

47. Most West European countries continue to prefer to deal with terrorism bilaterally, although some appear more receptive than before to expanded discussions in the EC, NATO, and the Summit Seven.¹ A recent meeting of experts on terrorism from the Summit Seven countries was held to discuss ways to increase cooperation in combating terrorist violence. Italy's Interior Minister has conducted a series of talks with his EC counterparts as a prelude to a possible EC initiative on terrorism. Additionally, the Foreign Ministers of the EC member countries have called for meetings of EC Interior and Justice Ministers this spring to discuss terrorism. Although NATO has limited

¹ The Summit Seven includes the United States, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Italy.

ed its involvement in dealing with terrorism, the issue—particularly the concern about physical security at Allied installations—is now being addressed at higher levels than previously.

Implications for US Interests

48. The main impact of the heightened terrorist threat on US interests is the requirement for increased security measures at installations and for stricter security around US officials considered to be potential targets. Terrorist goals and ideology do not appeal to the general public in West Germany, and there is no broadly based anti-US support movement. On the contrary, violence involving human casualties has tended to have a negative impact on public opinion. After the Zimmermann assassination, for example, West Germany's Green Party—which had called for better conditions for RAF prisoners—was severely criticized in the press by the three established political parties for maintaining an "undefined relationship with violence."

49. The story was somewhat different in Italy during the 1970s—a rather large minority of the population did support the goals, if not the violence, of the Red Brigades. After the Moro kidnaping, however, the Red Brigades apparently lost what public sympathy it had previously enjoyed. In other West European countries, with the exception of Spain and the United Kingdom, there has not been a serious domestic terrorist threat to test public opinion. In Spain and the United Kingdom there has been some sympathy with the goals of the terrorists among the Basque population and the Catholics in Northern Ireland, but this is only because those particular populations can identify with the ethnic separatist objectives of these terrorists. This is not the case with the vague anarchist doctrines of most West European terrorist groups.

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